2 October 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Attached letter from J. Edgar Hoover, Federal Bureau of Investigation, dated 27 September 1951

For more than a decade an outward appearance of unanimity has been maintained in the Politburo, and it is therefore impossible to evaluate the various rumors concerning alleged splits on matters of policy within this body. However, it is extremely unlikely that even a well developed difference of opinion could exist for any length of time, let alone a two-thirds to one-third split with Stalin in the numerical minority. The Politburo is composed of individuals hand-picked by Stalin for both loyalty and ability. They owe their advancement to his favor alone and continue in office by his sufference. The seemingly best reports on Politburo procedure indicate that a measure of discussion on the particular matter at hand occurs, but once Stalin has spoken the matter is decided. The history of the Soviet Communist Party shows that cliques maintaining a difference of opinion are simply not tolerated.

G. Malenkov is undoubtedly the most important individual under Stalin on Communist Party organizational matters and perhaps internal affairs in general. However, Molotov apparently is Stalin's first lieutenant on matters of foreign policy. It is believed that in the event of Stalin's death, Molotov would be Stalin's titular successor, probably ruling through a triumvirate of himself, Malenkov and Beriya, and that no drastic change in policy would immediately result. It is unlikely that a change of mind on Malenkov's part would influence Stalin to the extent suggested in the report.

There are certain apparent contradictions in the information. For example, while claims there is a two-thirds majority desiring war with the United States now, he adds that "the Soviets have not given up the idea of peace and if the Americans are earnest and the Soviets can believe the Americans they still desire peace".

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Furthermore, the warning that if the United States "keeps making trouble", Stalin will "consent to war" is particularly open to question as a plant.

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Nuclear Energy Division, of the Office of Scientific Intelligence, is unimpressed by reference to a "colossal thing" and knows of no scientific weapon in preparation in the USSR which could so drastically alter Soviet policy.

KINGMAN DOUGLASS Assistant Director, Current Intelligence

Attachment FBI letter dtd 27 Sept. 1951

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